I want to adopt the shift-view of negation, but change the paradigm: instead of shifting points, shift formulas. Thus, whether ¬ϕ holds ("here") depends on whether a certain different ψ holds ("here" too).
This paradigm makes "here" redundant, as it does to the whole idea of using frames of points.
Another idea of [1] I adopt is that negation is an exclusion operator, grounded on a primitive notion of incompatibility. This term has been used extensively in the literature, alas in different senses. For example, Restall [13] uses it as a relation between states (points) in an incompatibility frame, in the spirit of the Australian plan. Brandom [2] uses incompatibility as relation between sets of sentences and subsets of the power-set of sentences; and there are more.
In my plan the relata of incompatibility change: the are not associated with points, but are formulas and finite sets of simple formulas (conjunctions of atomic formulas) with an imposed primitive incompatibility on atomic sentences!
The key feature of my plan is not that it leads to paraconsistency, but rather that it leads to (a family of) contra-classical logics. But in contrast to other ways of obtaining contra-classicality, my plan obtains it without "loosing" classical validities, by avoiding closure under uniform substitution. Atomic formulas have an "absolute" deductive role.
My plan departs from standard conventions in yet another way. Usually, atomic formulas are considered independent of each other. In a model-theory based on valuations assigning truth-values to formulas, a valuation assigns a truth-value to an atomic formula independently of the truth-values it assigns to any other atomic formulas. According to my plan, there are dependencies among atomic formulas. In particular, (mutual) incompatibility is attributed by a model to (finite) collections of atomic formulas, constraining their truth-values. When used to define negation, the resulting negation is not just excluding an assertion, but also suggesting the truth of another assertion, an incompatible alternative to the excluded assertion. This approach is particularly suitable for a view according to which formulas are a "behind the scene regimentations" of some natural language sentences, and their interdependency incorporates into the logic some material connections. In [6] , this kind of negation is called 1 conversational negation, and is traced back to its origins in the linguistics literature.
Note that I am referring continuously to atomic formulas, not to propositional variables, as the generators of compound formulas. Indeed, this view does not support uniform substitutions, that would not preserve relationships among atomic formulas imposed by my plan.
Applying such an approach, for example, to obtain a Relevance Logic might impose relevance of one atomic sentence to another one, going beyond the traditional syntactic property of variable sharing in defining relevant implication and relevant consequence.
Atomic incompatibility bases
In the sequel, I assume a propositional object language freely-generated by a set P = {p i | i ≥ 0} of atomic formulas, ranged over by meta-variables p, q. For convenience, I assume the standard connectives: '¬' (negation), '∧' (conjunction), '∨' (disjunction and '→' (conditional). I use ϕ, ψ as metavariables ranging over formulas, α, β over conjunctions 2 of atomic formulas and Γ, ∆ -over finite sets of formulas. Definition 2.1 (atomic incompatibility base) An atomic incompatibility base is a mapping i : P ⇒ P f (P )/∅ (i.e., the range of i consists of finite, non-empty subsets of atomic formulas), s.t.:
Remarks:
1. By definition, for every p ∈ P, i(p) = ∅. Each atomic formula has at least one (other) atomic formula incompatible with it.
2. Incompatibility is irreflexive, symmetric and transitive.
3. The mapping i partitions P into incompatibility classes s.t. for every incompatibility class IC: if p, q ∈ IC then p ∈ i(q) (and, hence, q ∈ i(p)). Clearly, incompatibility classes are not equivalence classes, as incompatibility is not reflexive.
The intention is that truth-values are assigned in such a way that in every incompatibility class there is exactly one true member.
To direct the thought, the reader may think of a generic incompatibility class as a representation of colours 3 , where atomic formulas regiment sentences assigning a colour to some specific object, say o. Clearly, o can have exactly one colour (all over).
Next, the mapping i is extended toî, mapping also compound formulas. The range ofî consists of conjunctions of atomic formulas. Definition 2.2 (proper conjunctions of atoms) A conjunction of atoms α = ∧ 2≤j≤m p j is i-proper, denoted by π(α), if no q j 1 and q j 2 (for j 1 = j 2 ) are in the same IC of i.
A conjunction of atoms α which is not proper is improper. The role of being proper will become clear in the sequel.
Definition 2.3î
Note that for every ϕ,î(ϕ) contains only i-proper atomic conjunctions.
Example 2.1 For better readability, suppose we have the mnemonicallynamed atomic formulas.
{red, green, blue, short, long}
Consider an atomic incompatibility base i 0 satisfying
To avoid notational clutter and in anticipation of Definition 4.7, only relevant representatives ofî 0 are shown. The conjunctions generated by (2.4) are displayed modulo their commutativity.
From Definition (2.3) we have:
Corollary 1 (non-reflexivity) For every α: α ∈î(α).
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that for some
But this is impossible, as q 1 , a conjunct in α, cannot be p because q 1 ∈ i(q 1 ) and cannot be in β.
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that for some α α ∈î(ϕ)∩î(¬ϕ)
Butî(¬ϕ) = ∩ β∈î(ϕ)î (β), and α is one of those βs. Hence, α ∈î(α), contradicting the non-reflexivity Corollary 1.
Truth and consequence
The main point in the definition of truth (in a model) is that the atomic formulas in every incompatibility class are assigned a truth-value in a coordinated way, not independently of each other. In particular, some p ∈ IC is assigned f iff some q ∈ i(p) is assigned t.
Definition 3.4 (i-valuations) For a given atomic incompatibility base
For example, the atomic formula, say p, expressing the proposition 'o is red (all over)' is false iff one of the incompatible atomic formulas q ∈ i(p), expressing the proposition that o has another colour (all over), is true.
A i-valuation is naturally extended to compound formulas very much like in familiar definitions, but with truth under a valuation depending "in the background" on the atomic incompatibility base i.
An immediate corollary of (3.11 
The next theorem extends the dependency of truth on incompatible atomic sentences to compound formulas. It underlies the property of negation being not just excluding (the negated formula) but requiring the truth of one of the incompatible alternatives of the negated formula.
Definition 3.5 (truth characteristics) A set of conjunctions of atoms j(ϕ) is a truth characteristics (t-
Theorem 3.1 (truth and incompatibility) For every ϕ and every i-valuation v,î(ϕ) is the 4 t-characteristic for ϕ under i.
Spelled out in detail: For every ϕ and every i-valuation v:
Proof. The proof is by a simple induction on ϕ. I show the proof of one direction only, the proof of the other direction being similar. Fix an arbitrary i-valuation v.
Basis:
The basis is when ϕ = p, an atomic formula, and is given by (3.10).
Step: Assume (3.1) holds for ϕ i , i = 1, 2.
By the induction hypothesis, for every α ∈î(
Proposition 3.1 (double negation incompatibility) i(¬¬ϕ) =î(ϕ) (3.14)
Proof. It is immediately seen thatî(¬¬ϕ) is a t-characteristics for ϕ under i (andî(ϕ) is a t-characteristics for ¬¬ϕ under i) and so both are equal.
The definition of the model-theoretic notions of consequence and validity also resemble their usual definition, but they "hide" a different notion of truth and falsity in a model. i-validity: ϕ is i-valid iff ∅|= i ϕ.
An immediate corollary of the definition of i-consequence is the following.
Proposition 3.2 (Tarskian consequence relation) |= i is a Tarskian consequence relation for every atomic compatibility base i.
We can regard every atomic incompatibility base i and its associated consequence relation |= i as inducing a contra-classical logic L i
Observation: Every i-valuation is also a classical valuation, but not vice versa. Therefore, every classical validity (a tautology) is by definition also i-valid for every atomic compatibility base i. However, there are classically contingent formulas (i.e. classical non-tautologies), that may be i-valid for some i, because the refuting classical valuation is not a i-valuation for that i (see Example 3.2 below).
It is important to realise that not "loosing" classical tautologies does not contradict the post-completeness of classical logic, because each L i is not closed under uniform substitution, the latter being essential in the proof that adding validities to classical logic results in inconsistency.
By the same token, every classical contradiction is a i-contradiction for every atomic incompatibility base i. However, there are classically contingent formulas which are i-contradictions for some atomic incompatibility base i, because their satisfying classical valuations are not i-valuations for that i.
Thus, contra-classical logics are emerging from this definition of negation! In addition, for the same i, p|= i ¬q Again, this is not a classically valid consequence, but a refuting valuation is not a i-valuation.
Similarly, ¬(p∨q), classically contingent, is a i-contradiction for the above i.
It has no i-valuation validating it.
Theorem 3.2 (i-validity characterisation)
For every atomic compatibility base i:
Proof. 
Natural deduction for L i
In this section I introduce, for each i, a natural deduction system N i , capturing |= i . The idea is to useî itself within the I/E-rules.
Remark:
The presence ofî in the I/E-rules is analogous to the presence of worlds (and their accessibility relation) in natural-deduction systems for modal logics. See [7] and [12] , and further references herein.
Restrictingî to finite sets
There is a difficulty of usingî in the proof-system, namely the fact thatî(ϕ) can, in general, contain infinitely many conjunctions of atoms. However, since ϕ may have only finitely many atomic formulas as sub-formulas, only finitely many of the conjunctions inî(ϕ) are relevant to its deductive role. So, the first step is to restrictî(ϕ) to its finitely many relevant conjunctions.
Clearly,î r (ϕ) is finite for every ϕ. Furthermore,î r (ϕ) preserves Theorem 3.1.
The I/E-rules
By inspecting (3.11) one can realise that Gentzen's positive rules in N K, except the I/E-rules for negation, can be carried over to N i .
For negation, I introduce the following I/E-rules. The only non-standard case is negation.
By the induction hypothesis on the jth minor premise of ( 
Proof. The proof is almost like the analog proof for propositional classical logic, with one additional important detail. Assuming that Γ|= i ϕ but Γ N i ϕ, a counter model is obtained via the Lindenbaum lemma, applied to i-consistency, embedding Γ in a maximally-i-consistent setΓ. The additional burden of proof is to show that the valuation v defined by
is indeed an i-valuation. For that, one needs to establish that if ϕ ∈Γ, then α ∈Γ for every α ∈î(ϕ).
Assume, towards a contradiction, that both ϕ ∈Γ and α ∈Γ for some α ∈î(ϕ). Then, for some n ≥ 0, both ϕ ∈ Γ n and α ∈ Γ n . But then, both Γ n N i ϕ and Γ n N i ¬ϕ, the latter by applying (¬I i ) to α, contradicting the i-consistency of Γ n .
Atomic incompatibility bases and metaphysical grounding
Metaphysical grounding (henceforth, grounding) is a philosophical notion used for explaining the structure of reality (see [14] for a general introduction). Mostly, it is taken as a relation of dependency of a fact on a set of facts, where a fact is taken as (expressed by) a true proposition. I will conflate the use of those notions and speak mainly about the latter, to remain closer to the level of syntax. Being a dependency relation, grounding is typically considered as a partial ordering over facts.
Because grounding's relata are true propositions, expressed by sentences, it is natural to associate logics with grounds in order to specify the properties of this relation. Two well known logics of grounding are presented in [5] and [3] . A more recent one can be found in [9] .
As mentioned in [10] , one of the difficulties in devising logics for groundings is the treatment of negation. As noted in [8] , both in Fine's logic [5] and in Coreia's logic [3] , negation, differently from conjunction and disjunction, is treated only in its interaction with other connectives.
In [9] , Poggiolesi proposes an elaborate, rather complicated, logic for grounding, that has also rules for negation. Remarkably, for atomic propositions, Poggiolesi's insight's is very similar to that of the current paper. She notes that the truth of the negated atomic proposition the ball is not cubic can be grounded in the truth of the atomic proposition the ball is spherical, expressed in my terms, cubic ∈î(spherical) and spherical ∈î(cubic) (together with the other possible shapes). However, this is not followed by an expansion into a definition of grounding negated compound formulas as I do.
Without attempting here to devise a full logic of grounds, I do propose the following definition for grounds of negated formulas. That is, the grounds of a negated sentence are positive incompatible sentences of a particularly simple form.
For example, the ball is green (all over) is one of the ultimate grounds of the ball is not red (all over).
I refer to g[[¬ϕ]]
as 'ultimate 5 ' because of its constitution only of conjunctions of atomic formulas. In a sense, this notion of grounding is a kind of transitive closure of more common definitions of grounding, grounding negated sentences on "atomic facts" only, the latter conceivable as "building blocks" of reality.
I believe that a general notion of ultimate grounds is worth pursuing for arbitrary truths, not just negated ones. I leave this for further research.
Conclusions
I presented a plan for negation, proposing a paradigm shift from the Australian plan, leading to a family of contra-classical logics L i . The two main ideas are the following:
1. Instead of shifting points of evaluation (in a frame), shift the evaluated formula.
2. Introduce an incompatibility set for every atomic formula, extended to any compound formula, and impose the condition on valuations that a formula evaluates to true iff all the formulas in its incompatibility set evaluate to false. Thus, atomic sentences are not independent in their truth-values.
I have also presented a sound and complete natural deduction proof system N i for every L i .
In addition, the kind of negation considered in this paper is shown to provide an innovative notion of grounding negation.
By imposing other (than incompatibility) relations among atomic formulas as restricting valuation, other families of logics can be obtained. I pursue elsewhere variations on this theme.
What about paraconsistency and paracompleteness?
I believe the right way to obtain them is to change the definition of logical consequence, not of the meanings of the connectives. Adopting Priest's null account in [11] leads to the following definition of logical consequence, both paraconsistent and paracomplete:
For a given atomic incompatibility base i, ψ is a (logical) i-consequence of Γ, denoted Γ|= i ϕ, iff: 
